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Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
Yale University
Cnce upon a tine foreign money doctors roaned La.tin
•

.Alrerica prescribing fixed exchange rates and passive gold~xchange
standard J1D1etary rules.

Bankers followed 1n their footsteps, fran the

halls of McnteZtDTa to the shores of Daiquiri.

'lb

the delight of local

dignitaries, the not-so-exigente financiers would yield convertible
cash for IOU' s.

Such normalcy during the late 1920s appeared even 100re

attractive than that inrrediately preceding the first world war.

In

sane countries, such as Brazil, convertibility and fixed rates appeared
to have been purchased at the price of sl~sh growth; 1n other countries,
such as C.Olart:>ia, gold standard rulea permitted significant_1nnation.
Yet m::>st observers enphasized the virtues of a monetary system which
m1n1miv.ed possible shocks fran irrespoosible danestic politicians and

maintained intematiooal creditworthiness.

Coocem also existed in the

1920s about the weakness in sane markets for staple export products,
often aggravated by rising protectionism at the Center, but both foreign
loans and the optimism of the tines ma.de such concerns fleeting ones.
'Ille La.tin American balance of pa.yrrents equilibrium of the late

1920s was rudely and repeatedly shocked fran the outside, starting in
1929 and throughout the 1930s {and 1940s). '!he occasional danestic earth
quake, crop failure, or indigenous madman 1n authority, paled into in
si@1lificance ~ with the external shocks; in the case of the latter
it could often be argued that he was an endogenous product of the dis

turbed external circllllStances and exanples.

-2'lhis paper will chronicle the major external shocks of the
1930s and sane of the ways various Latin American ecooanies coped with

them.

It will be seen that the performance of several eca,anies was

remarkably good, under the circumstanc es.

'lhis will lead us to examine

the mechanisms of adjustment at work during that decade, and the extent

to which they were prodded aloog by Autooaoous Policy.
developnent s will be examined first.

Exchange rate

'lhl.s will be followed by a look

at m:>netary and fiscal policies, a section hobbled even 100:re than others by
lack of data. Dur1ng the 1930s n:,st Latin American countries perfonned
mratoria m their external public debts; discussion of the causes and
coosequence s of that caitroversi al and meDDrahle step deserves a sectim

of lts own.

Sane ren~c~ims close the paper.

~

and perfonnance

In a world of fixed exchange rates, the slowdot.'n in the Center

eccrianies already visible in 1929 was quickly translated into a decline
of export values in the Periphery.

'!he deepening slunp plus addi tiooal

protectiarl .st measures at the Center, such as the U.S. Sm:>ot-Hawley
tariff of 1930, the British Abnonna.1 Inportatia'lS Act

Catm::nwealth preferences

or 1932,

or

1931, the Ottawa

and s1m:1lar actia'lS by the French,

Gennan, and Japanese enpires, led to sharp declines in the Latin American

tenns of trade and a milder fall of their export quantum. 'lhe purchasing
power of expOrts, which for countries such as Brazil and CUba was already

decl1n1.ng in the late 1920s, took a sharp dive between 1928/29 and 1932/33,

as may

be

seen in Table 1 for a sanple or Latin American countries. 1

A vigorous recovery after 1932/33 was interrupted by the 1937/38 recession
1n the U.s. ; for the decade as a whole the purchasing power

showed declines between 25 and 40 percent. '!he

or exports
early· years .or the seca,d
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TABIE 1
Fore~ Trade Indicators 1n Selected La.tin American Countries,

1928/29-1942/43

(Percentage changes between years shown)

A. Purchasing Power of Exports
Argentina

Brazil

Colanbia

Cuba

'7.xico

1928/29-1932/33
1932/33-1936/37
1936/37-1938/39
1938/39-1942-4~

-41.2
63.4
-28.8
-10.7

-42.3
33.3
-9.2
3.7

-36.o
24.o
-5.0
-9.7

-56.1
61.8
-8.4
40.6

-61.9
77.5
-9.9
-6.2

1928/29-1938/39

-31.5

..30.1

-24.7

-34.9

-39.0

CUba

Mexico

J3. Int,ort Quantum

Argentina

Brazil

.Colanbia

1928/29-1932/33
1932/33-1936/37
1936/37-1938/39
1938/39-1942/43

-so.o

-45.1
-1.-4
-57.5

-56.2
63.3
-2.0
-28.1

-59.6
93.0
10.9
-53.3

-68.o

94.6
-2.0
17.3

-55.4
82.2
-11.0
8.2

1928/29-1938/39

-28.4

-29.9

-13.5

-39.0

-27.7

Sources and method:

Basic data, except for CUba, obtained fran (E)AL 1976.

Percentage changes were cooputed between two-year averages.

CUban purchasing

power of exports and 1.nport quantum obtained by dividing indices of the
value of exports and inports by the United States wholesale price index.
Direccim General de Estadistica 1959, pp. 24-25.

world war had mixed effects oo Latin Arrerican econcrm.es:

loss of

European markets and shipping shortages led to fresh export troubles 1n
1940 and 1941 in eeveral countries.
While overall trends in the Center countries daninated the
Latin American export picture, the export perfonnance of individual
countries was also marked by good or bad luck in the "camooity lottery"
as well as by atten;:,ts at export praootion and diversification , even
under the gloat\Y conditioos of the 1930s. Exant:>les of export gains
after 1933, with good fortune and policy efforts playing different roles,
include the cases of Peruvian and Colanbian gold, Mexican silver (on_
which mre will be said later), Argentine com and fruits, Brazilian
cotton and Venezuelan oil.
As already noted, during the 1920s Latin American balance of

payments were bolstered by large capital inflows, with New York replacing
Ialdon as the source of long term portfolio funds.

Direct foreign in

vestment was aiso si@Pificant, and began to go intQ manufacturing activities.
Well before Latin American countries showed signs of skipping scheduled
servicing of the external debt, gross capital 1nnows fell sharply.
After 1930 little fresh capital

~

in.

With the dollar price level

falling unexpectedly by around one quarter between 1928-29 and 1932-33,
debt servicing rose dramatically in real tenns, caipressing the capacity
to inport beyood what is suggested 1n Table 1-A.

As may be seen 1n Table 1-B,

the inport quant1.111 fell even mre than the purchasing power of exports
between

1928-29 and 1932-33, except 1n Mexico.

By

1934 all countries

except Argentina, Haiti and the Ixln1nican Republic had suspended nonnal
servicing of the external natiaial debt.

Fran then to the end of the

decade inport volumes as a rule recovered raster than the purchasing
power of exports.

-5The

early years of the second world war provided a different

kind of shock to toost Latin ~rican ecooanies : even when the foreign
exchange was available ilqx>rts could not be obtained, either because of
strict rationing by the Allied powers or due to shipping stx>rtages.
The

more distant a country fran the Allied powers, geographically and

politically, the DDre intense and longer-lived was this supply sock;
for Argentina it could be said to have lasted well into the late 1940s,
while it was nuch milder and briefer for Mexico, with its overland links
to the U.S., and for CUba after the Axis suanarines had been· driven
fran her coasts.
'lhe emergence of a protectionist and nationalistic Center,

prone to deflation and war, was the greatest shock to Latin American
econanies during the 1930s. It is true that as early as 1934 Cordell
Hull, U.S. secretary of state, started a policy of reducing U.S. tariffs,
but such policy made slow progress, and had to whittle down a tariff
wall raised not only by the Srooot-Hawley Act but also by the deflation
induced incre~ 1n the incidence of specific duties (Haberler 1976,
pp. 33-34) • Other major industrialized colU'ltries retreated further into
protectiau.sm, bringing their colonies ever toore closely into their
camercial and financial "ecooanic carmunities", with negative trade
diverting consequences for sovereign Latin American countries.

'lhe meroory

of this betrayal of Hume, Smith, and Ricardo would linger longer in the
Periphery than in the Center.
'!be open

Latin American econanies of the late 1920s were quite

wlnerable to this sequence of outside shocks, especially in the early
1930s.

Yet bits and pieces of evidence indicate that at least sane of

-6those econanies managed to weather the storm better than the U.S. (and
Canada) .
largest

Table 2 presents availab le nationa l accounts data for the four
republic s.

CcJlt>ared to the U.S.,

aggregate output during 1929-39

experien ced less violent fluctuat ions and expanded faster in the four

La.tin American countrie s.

Cne soould note, however, that neasurenEnts

of Gross Ixmestic Product shown in Table 2 do not take into account
losses of real inc~ arising fran deterior ating tenns of trade.

Taking

these losses into account reduces Brazilia n aggregate growth during
1929-39, for exanple , fran 4.3 percent per annun to 3.2 percent , according
to the source listed in Table 2. For Argentina, it may be estimate d _
that a similar correcti on would reduce annual growth rran 1.6 percent to
1.2 percent per annum. Cn the other hand, estimate s for Gross Natiooa l

Product (not availab le) would soow faster growth rates, as factor pa_yments
abroad fell sharply d ~ the 1930s, as will be seen later.
Table 2 also shows an interes ting contras t between U.S. and
La.tin .Am:!rican aggregate perfonnance during the early war years. Supply
shocks and fuller use of capacity around 1939 kept Argentine, Brazilia n
and Colanbian expansioo during 1939-lt3 at annual rates below those register ed
even during 1937-39.
It could be

argued

that the aggregate perfonnance shown in

Table 2 1s far fran inpress ive, and that the favorable contras t with the
U.S. 1s ioostly explained by the larger weight of price- and incane- inelasti c
rural output in Latin American aggrega te product ioo.

In fact, the mst

1npress1ve evidence of favorab le La.tin American perfonnance during the
1930s will not be found 1n aggrega te data. '!he 1930s were a decade of

maJ or structu ral changes: sane sectors boaned while others collapse d.
'lbe major leading sector was industr ial output, as may be seen 1n Table 3.

-7TABIE 2
Aggregate Real Output

1n

Selected Countries, 1929-1943

(Percentage changes between years shcM'l)

Arger1tina

Brazil

ColooiJia

Mexico

USA

1929-33
1933-37
1937-39
1939-43

-9-7
23.2
4.9
8.4

7.6
31.7
7.1
9.7

9.9
16.4
13.0
4.5

-10.3
28.0
25.3

-28.9
47.0
1.7
53-3

192g-39

16.7

51.7

44.6

23.0

6.3

Sources and

CEPAL 1978.

nethod:

1.2

Data for Argentina, Colanbia and Mexico were obtained fran

'!hose from Brazil were obta.1ned fran Haddad

1978, Table l. All

of these data refer to gross danestic product at constant prices.
USA data were obtamed fran Census

1960, p .139. 'lhese data refer to Gross

National Product at constant prices.
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TABIB 3
Real Industrial Production, 1929-1943
(Percentage changes between years shown)
1929-33

1933-37

1937-39

1939-43

1929-39

-6.5
6.9

Uruguay

-50.0a
-7.9
n.a.

31.5
53.7
49.2
90.2
46.8
n.a.

10.0
13.4
24.7
-8.8
12.7
n.a.

18.0
19.1
16.1
4.7
45.9
n.a.

35.2
86.2
132.l
a
-13.2
52.3
58.3a

USA

-36.9

66.7

-5.0

133.3

-1.7

Argentina
Brazil
Cblart>ia
Cuba

Mexico

24.7

8Fercentage change relative to 1930
n.a. • data are not available
Sources and method:

As 1n

Table 2, except for

Cuba and Uruguay.

Except

for Cuba, Latin American data refer to value added by the manufacturinp; sector,
neasured at constant prices.
index of manufactures,
Perez-Lopez

1972 , p. 251.

g1 ven

USA data refer to the Federal Reserve Board

in

Census

1960, p. 409.

Cuban

data obtained fran

1977, p.53. Uruguayan data obtained fran Millot, Silva and Silva

-9Here we do find a remarkable cootrast between, sa.y, Brazilian and Colc:rnbian
industria l growth

and

that of the U.S.; Brazilian industria l expansicn

during the 1930s was also faster than that experienced by the same country
dur1ng the

1920s.

So

shows

far the term I.atin America has been used loosely. Table 3

ooe La.tin

American

country whose perfonnance was weaker and mre

erratic than that of the U.S. '!he Cuban case suggests that a typology
may be desirable ; for reasoos that will becare clearer later oo, ooe IrEY

differen tiate between the larger or active I.atin American republics and
the smaller or passive ooes. While data for the latter type are especiall y

scarce, the Caljectur e is that tl)e small or passive republics ,

mainly

those in the Caribbean and sooe in Central Am:!rica, were dragged down by
the U.S. perfonnance as surely as the states of Mississip pi and Arkansas.
Si~ is not the a'lly characte ristic different iating the two types of
co1.11tries, as Cuba 1n the late 1920s had a danestic market not very dif
ferent fran that of Uruguay ( or Chile), whose perfonnance was s1m1.lar
to those of larger countries .

Note that "small" or "large" in this

typology do not necessari ly refer to the capacity of different countries
to influence their extemal tenns of trade.
'lhe early war years cooled the industria l boan in Argentina ,

Brazil and Colart>ia; not surprisin gly, Mexico shows a perfonnance during

1939-43 in between those of the other large Latin .American countries

and

that of the U.S.
'lhe

structura l changes noted above for the econorey as a wtx>le

can also be found within the industria l sector. Even as sane manufacturing
activitie s closely dependent oo pre-1929 export-or iented prosperit y were
shr1.nk1ng or

stagnatin g (exail¥)les include meat-packing, flour-mil ling and

sugar-ref ining), other activitie s, sanetimes a handful, made drama.tic .
output advances during the 1930s. Textiles, cement, petrole1..1n refining,

tires, phannaceuticals, toiletries and food-processing for the mre
market are exanples of boan1ng sectors.

For several countries textiles

appear as quantitatively the roost 1nportant, often providing roore than
20 percent of the net expansicn of manufacturing value added,

aoo

growing

at annual rates above 10 percent. '!be rural sector also witnessed a
gain :1n the productioo of "inportables" relative· to "exportables".
Oltput growth 1n the boan1ng industrial sectors rar outstripped

the expansion of total domestic absorpticn or those manufactured goods,
which followed DDre closely the somewhat sluggish growth of aggregate
output.

Export expansioo explains little of this gap:

it was 1nport

cootraction, 1n both absolute tenns and relative to danestic absorptioo,
which corrpletes the picture.

~rt-substitution, def1ned 1n its

purely accounting sense as a decline 1n the ratio of inports to danestic
absorptioo, became t h e ~ of growth of the 1930s, and not just 1n
manufacturing; several rural activities experienced trends s1milar to
those described above for textiles, cement, and phannaceuticals.

SUch

inport-replacen!nt,oft en squeezing productive capacity already installed
during the 1920s, helped both to cope with balance of paym?nts difficulties
and to maintain levels of enployment; for COlD1tries such as Argentina

and Brazil there is evidence that the industriallzatia, drive seems to
have been quite labor-absorbing, with output elasticities of ent:>loynent

'!he cenent industry provides a ccnerete exanple of sane aspects

of the in:port-substitutioo process sketched above.

Table 4 ~ s three

year cmsun:ptim averages 1n the late 1920s and 1930s, and the share in

that absorptim produced danesticall.y. Mexico and the South American
republics, w1 th a few exceptims, show both sane increase 1n total

-11-

TABIB 4
<l!ment:

Ccnsunpticn and Output
Apparent Cement
Cals~tia,. 1n
1936-37-38
(1927-28-29-100)

Danestic Output as
Percentage or Apparent
Ccnsunptioo

1927-28-29
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colaii>ia
Mexico
Ecuador
Paraguay

Peru
Uruguay

Venezuela
Q!ntral American .Republics(six)
Cuba

150
128
112
115
126
152
140
145
127
76
116
ll3
37

35
28
14

44
6

87
15
0
46

1936-37-38
94
69
89
99
12
97
57
0

66

14

92
28

l2

12
93

79

Haiti
~can :Republic

50

90
0

79

0

0

C8nada

49

U'lited States

64

102
100

100
100

0

Sources and Method: Basic data 1n physical magnitudes obtained f?'all
European Cement Associatim 1967, pp. 27-43. Apparent CCl'lSlllPtiai refers
to cenent production plus inports less exports.

-12caunmptioo and an inpress;ve jlllq) 1n the share of hane productioo.
Public works programs in Argentina and Mexico led to especially vigorous
e:xpansioo 1n ccnsurrptioo, while the leap in the coefficient

or

~stic

supplies is mst notable for Brazil and Colart>ia. 'Ille Csr1bbean
islands, 1n cmtrast, present a picture as melancholy as that for Canada
and the United States.

'!he

Central American republics show no gain

1n inport substitutioo, but a surprisingly good perfonnance in total

CCl'lsunptioo.
Exchange rate policies
All Latin .American cmmtries which experienced v1goroue·1ndustrial
expansia, during the 19308 had by 1932 at the latest abandooed cooverti
bility and other gold-standard rules of the

gaJJE.

Exchange cootrol.8 were

adopted 1n many countries following the devaluatioo of the potmd. sterling
1n Septent>er 1931.

Large

or active countries by 1933 had exchange rates

relative to the dollar sfmificantly above the late 1920s parities and
the use of nultiple' exchange rates became widespread.

'these measures

were adopted as gold and forei@'11 exchange reserves dw1ndled or disappeared,
and there was little enthusiasm 1n their enactnlmt; governments viewed
them

as regrettable energency operatioos and there was nuch 1.nprov:1.satioo and

confusion 1n their management. Yet governments had the

good

sense of rejectfug

advioe, such as that proffered by Sir Otto Niemeyer to the Brazilian
govennent in July 1931, to adopt denatimary neasures so as to return

to coovertibillty at fixed parities (de Paiva Abreu 1974,p.15).
Small or passive countries, such as Guatemala, Haiti, Danin1can
Republic, Panama and CUba maintained their peg to the U.s. dollar t ~ t
the 19308. '.lbe last two countries did not even have a Central Bank

-13or a correspooding central IID'letary authority (such as toose of Brazil,
or pre-1935 Argentina). Exchange caitrol measures 1n these small
countries were t1.mid or nmexistent.
Regardless of the exchange rate policy followed, a country sUb
_'jected to an exogenous and permanent

worsening

tenns of trade should witness over the la,g

?Vl

of its inU:matiooal

a decline 1n the price

of its nm-traded goods and services relative to the·danestic price of
inportable

goods,

encouraging a movement of resources toward the inport

carpeting sector, additmal to that generated by the decline 1n exportable
prices. lklder a gold-exchange standard with fixed rates and with col-_
lapsing 1ntematiatal prices for both inports and exports, nai-traded
goods

prices and danestic liquidity had a la,g way to fall.

It is

the working hypothesis of this sectiat that countries willing and able
to devalue their exchange rate moved toward the new constellatiat of

danestic relative prices m:>re speedily than toose with fixed rates,
thus 11m1t1ng both price and Da1etary deflatiat, and CCX1ta1ning
their negative 1.Dpact oo real output.
Table 5 shows nan1nal exchange rates with respect to the dollar
1n the four largest Latin American countries. Starting 1n 1933 these
data refer to average ·rates relevant for 1.Dports. '!here is sane erratic
behavior during 1932-34 1n Argentina and Brazil, COtl'ltries caught 1n
tricky triangular relatimships with the United States and the United
Kingdan,

nows.

involving 1n different mixes unbalanced carmercial and financial
But the depreciating trend 1s clear. Like exchange cootrols,

the depreciations were accepted by the authorities with sane reluctance,
.and even a.rter abandcnnent of cawert1b111ty attenpts were made to 11m1t
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TABIE 5
Nan:1.nal Ave
rt Exchange Rates 1925-1939
Units of local Ctn:Tency per one U.S. dollar
Argentina
(Pesos)

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

2.149
2.47
2.36
2.36
2.39
2. 74 .

3.46
3.89
3.23
3.49
3.53
3.45
3.25
3.42
3.87

Brazil
(Cruz.eiros)

8.17

6.87

8.35
8.29
8.48
9.21
14.3
14.1

12.7

14.7
17.4
17.2

16.0
17.6
19.2

Colanbia
(Pesos)

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.011
1.05
1.25
1.66
1.78
1.75
1.77
1.79
1.75

Sources and method: - Sources for Argentine data are
Diaz Alejandro 1980b, p.21.
1977, p.515.

1977, p.216.

2.03
2.07
2.12
2.08
2.15
2.26
2.65
3.16
3.50
3.60
3.60
3.60
3.60

4.52

5.19
g1ven 1n

detail 1n

Brazilian data obtained from Malan et al

Colombian data obtained fran

sources cited there.

Mexico
(Pesos)

Ocanpo

1980, p.213, and from

Mexican data obtained from Nacional Financiera

-15their extent.
and

Exchange rates applicable to trad1tiooal export earnings

the purchase of foreign exchange for debt 8ervice depreciated by

less than those shown 1n Table 5.

Indeed, one 1.rmediate iootivatioo for

adopting exchange cootrols and multiple rates was to guarantee the
Treasury's

cheap

access to the foreign exchange required to service the

external public debt.

Hard-pressed Treasuries also welc~d the fresh

revenues generated by the spread between h1P1l selling and low buying
exchange rates.
Purchasing-pow er-parity should not be expected to hold 1n an
ecoo~ subjected to real shocks •. As may be seen in Table 6, price levels
1n major La.tin American countries generally fell by less and rose by

m:>re than United States .prices during the 1930s. But the differences are
small relative to the magnitudes of exchange rate depreciatioo, as may
be

seen directly 1n Table 7.

'Dlis table calculates indices of real

. inport exchange rates, denating the nominal rates of Table 5 by the
price levels given in Table 6; canparisons are only made vis-a-vis the
United States.
As

of

goods

the price level indices of Table 6 have as broad a coverage

and services as possible, the real exchange rates of Table 7

can be taken as rough proxies for the danestic price of 1nportable
relative to the non-traded

goods

goods

price, or alternatively, as an index

of profitability 1n ilrport substituting activities. Table 7 data are
ally proxies because they do not take into account increnents in La.tin

.American protectioo, due either to tariffs or quantitative restrictions,
which occurred during the 1930s, while using the United States G.N.P.

deflator as an indicator of 1ntemat1Cl'la1. prices for Latin American
inportable goods.

While the neglect of protectia, 1.11derest1mates the

-16TABIB 6
Price level Ind1cators 2 1925-1939
(1929-100) ·
Argentina
104.1
101.0
100.0
99.1
100.0
101.0
87.0
78.o
88.o
78.0

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

82.1

89.7
92.1
91.5
92.9

Brazil

Coloni:>1a

116.1
95.1
93.0
103.7
100.0
87.6
78.1
79.3

91.7
103.7
100.0
111.2
100.0
79.2
64.0
53.6
55.2
76.8
80.0
84.8
86.4
97.3
101.6

11.1

82.6
86.5
87.9
96.3
99.3
101.3

ffexico

USA

92.B
93.5
95.1
97.0
100.0
105.7
89.7
79.1
81.0
80.2
88.2
98.5
119.4
124.-0
127.0

101.0
101.0
99.0
100.0
100.0
96.0
85.0

11.0
75.0

Bo.a

79.0
82.0
. 83.0
83.0
82.0

•

Sources and method: Argentine data as in Table 5; they refer to the cost
of living index :ui the Federa l Capital_- Brazil ian data refer to an ilrplic it
G.D.P. denato r, given in Haddad 1978, p.166. Colanbian data refer to a
cart>ination of wholesale food price 1ndJ_ces (pre-1937) and a cost or living
index (beginn ing 1n 1937); obtained as in Table 5. Mexican data refer to
an inplic it G.D.P. deflato r, given 1n Solis 1970, pp. 104-105. U.S. data
refer to the 1npllc it G.N.P. denato r, given in Census 1960, p.139.

-17TABLE 7
Indices

or Real

Inport Exchange P.ates 2 1925-1939

(1929-100)

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

Argentina

Brazil

101.1
103.3
97.7
99.6
100.0
108.9
141.4
160.7
115.2
149.7
140.7
132.0
122.9
129.9
142.9

83.7
86.0
104.9
94.3
100.0
118.9
183.5
161.5
144.6
167.8
187.4
189.2162.7
173.5
183.3

Colanbia

109.0
96.!t
98.o
89.0
100.0
122.4
134.1
146.4
164.9
167.9
170.6
164.3
165.1
148.3
137.1

Mexico

102.7
104.0
102.6
99.7
100.0
95.5
116.9
143.1
150.7
166.9
150.0
139.4
116.3
140.7
155.8

Sources and method: calculated fran data 1n Tables 5 and.6, as
explained 1n the text.

-181ncrease 1n the relative price of 1.nportables, the second cmsideratioo
probably cmtributes toward overestimation.
An additional bit of insiFht may be obtained carpar1ng whole

sale price indices w1 th those for the cost of 11v1ng.

Qtly two

La.tin

American countries have reliable series ror the 1930s; those are presented
1n Table 8 and cmtrasted with United States data.

Wholesale prices

cover both inportables and exportables; it is thus remarkable that for
both Argentina and Chile wholesale prices since 1929 fell less and rose
BDre than the cost of living index, a trend in marked cmtrast with
that for the United States.

Data m nrney wages are very scarce for

the period under cmsideratioo; if ooe assunes wages followed the cost
of living, the evidence presented in Table 8 is CCJ'lt)atible with the
h.YPC>thesis of rising profitability 1n the production of tradable goods,
mainly

in the illport-caipeting sector ..2
It has already been observed that, contrary to what would

happen in many Iatin American cot11tr1es after the second world war,
during the 19308 both exchange rates and protectiCX'list measures l'IX>ved

1n the same directia, 1n active cot11tries, i.e., real depreciatioos,
tariff increases and inport and exchange quantitative restrictioos were
thrown

into the balance of payments battle, particularly in carpressing

inports.

A full discussia, of carmercial policies, 1nclud1ng the

cooplexities of bilateral clearing arrangenents 1nposed en the regia,
by British and German policies, is outside the scope of this paper.
But 1n light of postwar policies and controversies, it is worth noting

that 1n the inportant case of Argentina, the real average export rate

was not allowed to appreciate, 1n spite of the

glOCll'tY

outlook for

,''•

-19TABIE 8
Wholesale Price Indices Relative to Cost of Living Indices
(1929-100)
Argentina

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

94
106
120
107
131
121
113
126
119
120

Chile
88
81
ll5
139
138
135
137
146
133
128

U.S.A.

93
86
86
92
101
105
105
108
100
100

Sources and method: Argentine and Chilean data obtained fran League
of Natioos 1945, pp. 193 and 197. United States data as 1n Table 6.
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exports (see Diaz Alejandro 1980b, pp. 2-3 for documentatioo, including
real rates with respect to both the U.S. dollar and sterling).
TraditiCl'lal exports facing market restrictiC11S abroad were of course
handled so as to avoid further price declines, but noo-traditiCl'lal
exports were g1ven favorable treatment, earning the ioore depreciated

rates which had to be paid by 1.nporters lacking licenses.

A major

architect of these policies was Raul Prebisch. 3 Modest export di
versificatioo occurred 1n Argentina and in sane other countries.
~netary and fiscal policies
'lhe rise of inportable goods prices relative both to exportable

and non-traded

goods

prices resulting frail the exogenous deterioration

1n the external ternis of trade as well as frail exchange-rate and pro

tectionist measures encouraged investment in inport-substitution. But
aggregate demand was subjected to powerful denationary forces which
could have overwhelmed those incentives. '!he decline 1n export values
sigrlalling the crisis was accarpanied by ilmediate balance of payments
deficits which drained reserves and roney supplies, according to gold
standard rules.

'!he export fall had 1.n;>ortant multiplier effects.

'Ihl.s

section will exam:1.ne how those denationary pressures on aggregate demand
were contained and eventually reversed.

In cotmtries without well-developed

financial markets it is difficult to isolate purely fiscal frail JOOnetary
policies.

D.lr1ng

the 1930s only Argentina had financial markets of sane

sophistication, so this section will discuss aggregate macroecooanic
policies without establishing veey fine distinction between JOOl'letary and
fiscal mes.
Table 9 presents data on money supplies.

With the exception

of Cuba, Latin American cotmtries show briefer or shallower post-1929

. :·'

-21declines 1n m:>ney supplies than the United States.

By

1932 Brazilian

m:>ney supply exceeded that of 1929; the corresponding Colanbian date

is 1933. 'Ihe end of convertibility 1n Argentina, Brazil, Colanbia
and Uruguay

was helpful 1n stenming the loss of liquidity, while 1n

CUba the inability to break out of (then) orthodox JOOnetary rules led
to a m::>netary deflation even greater than that of the United States.

Maintenance of liquidity was not sinply a matter of ending
convertibility. Ch the one hand, even after the abandorlnent of the gold
standard, sane countries such as Argentina shipped gold abroad to
service the external debt and sold foreign exchange to stem currency
depreciation.

Both neasures cut the m:,netary base.

as early as 1931 South Anerican IOOnetary authorities

Ch the other hand,
began

to adopt

neasures which Professor E.W. Kemnerer and Sir Otto Niemeyer would have
fOWld unsound.

'lhus, the Argentine "caja de Conversicn" whose old and

only duty was to exchange gold for domestic currency and vice versa,

began 1n 1931 to issue danestic currency 1n exchange for private camercial
paper.

By

1932 the old "Csja" even issued danestic currency against

Treasury paper (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 1972, pp.262-263).
'lhe Colanbian Central Bank began 1n 1931 for the first tine

to engage 1n

direct operations with the public, discounting notes endorsed by two
first-class corporations and lending oo the security of warehouse receipts.
Government bondswere plm:hased 1n
Bam.e1-.si."lCe 19~-

As

large

quantities ey ~tae -~lotnpian Central

noted by Robert Triffin, with the introduction of

exchange cootrol 1n 19311n Colanbia, 1ntematimal reserves ceased to
govern monetary issue, which fran then on was predaninantly influenced by
internal consideraticns of econanic policy or budgetary expediency.
(Triffin 1944, pp. 23-25). Very much the same could be said for all
active Latin American countries.
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TABIB 9
Nan1nal Mone;y Sup2lies
(F.nd of 1929-100)

End of:

1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941

.Argentina

Brazil

Colcrnbia

101.3
100.0
100.l

100.9
100.0
95-5
99.5
107.2
103.0
119.2
130.7
143.6
150.3
186.-lJ
195.2
209.5
271.1

89.3

88.5
87.3
87.9
87.6
96.2
102.2
100.2

103.3
105.4
122.l

Cuba

·0ruguay

USA

136.6
100.0
79.3
10.2
84.2
104.5

107.5
100.0
74.5
61.5
51.0
119.9

121'."

Ji6.8

90.5
100.0
103.2
100.9
101.0
103.7
105.6
112.2
131.8
146.6
150.5
154.5
163.0
175.6

101.5
100.0
96.0
81.lt
74.2
67.2
76.4
87.9
98.1
95.9
101.5
111.7
125.7
139.7

127.5
153.4
158.2
175.l
180.8
195.6
217.4

Jf9.5
56.3
66.4
64.4
68.o
75.6
89.1

Sources and nethod: Argentine data refer to an aggregate slightly higher
than"~"; obtained fran canite Naciooal de Geografia 1941 and 1943. 'Ibis
series follows closely the"~" of Diz 1970, p.146, for the period of overlap.
Brazilian data refer to the"~" series of Neuhaus, 1975, pp. 158-59. Colombian
data refer to the"~" series presented in Banco de la Pepublica 1971, pp.104-105.
CUban data refer to the "Mi" series presented in Wallich, 1950, pp.38,76,and
152. Uruguayan data refer to the"~" series presented in Banco Central
del Uruguay n.d. United States data refer to the"~" series presented
in Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, Table A-1, pp. 712-716.

-23'Ihe then heterodox South .Arrerican IIDl"letary policies started

around 1932 were 1n sare ways a "relapse" into past inflationary pro
pensities, a past which was ireant to be exorcised
gold standard rules.

by

the adoption of

'Ihus, the Argentine "caJa" relied on nearly

forgotten laws to rediscount private camercial paper; indeed, irem:::>ries
of wild innation under incoovertible paper during the late nineteenth
century, menx>ries still fresh during 1929-31, ~red and slowed down
the adoption of 100re self-assured and expansionist m:netary policies.
It should also be borne 1n mind that as late as the early nDnths of

1931 there were optimistic reports of an upturn 1n the major econan1.es
(Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 1972, p.280).
In cootrast with the United States, there are no reports

of w.ldeeprea,d bank failm,es in South American collltries during the
early 1930s. Also 1n contrast with the 'lhl.ted States, n::,netary aggregates
fail to reveal a -night into currency and away fran bank deposits;
if aeything, during the early stages of the depression the opposite
appears to have occurred, as

may

be seen in Table 10.

In active Latin

.American countries m:netary authorities sinply did not let banks fail,
casting fears of moral hazard to the wind. While rooratoria oo domestic
bank debts were decreed 1n

many

countries (much earlier than in the

United States), freezing banks' assets, cairnercial banks were supported
1n a mnnber of ad hoc wa.vs, not all of them conducive to maintaining

actual liquidity.

Thus 1n Brazil as early as October 1930 withdrawals

of bank deposits 1r1ere restricted by decree (Neuhaus 1975, p.104).
Rediscounting

or

carmercial banks' loans was al§o vigorously carried out

by Central Banks and institutions such as the Banco do Brasil and the

Banco de la Nacioo Argentina.

thorthodoxy was s<m!tires cloaked

by

-24TABIE 10

Currency Held by the Public as Percentage of Money Supply
Argentina

Brazil

18.1
18.1
17.l
17.3
16.4
16.7
18.2
19.6
19.9
25.5
20.6
20.5
21.5

30.5
28.0
26.9
26.8
21.2
28.7
26.4
28.8
30.2
30.6
25.3
26.1

21.2

25.9

Colanbia

Chile

CUba

Uruguay

USA

30.9
29.8
26.l
27.1
23.3
26.0
28.2
28.8
33.2
30.9
30.9
29.6
31.6
29.8

8.2
8.3
8.6
12.3
14.2
15.7
13.0
12.1
12.2
12.6
12.0
12.1
12.6
14.9

Fnd or:

1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1931'
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941

Sources and method:

25.8

63.8
66.4
64.6
65.4
58.0
59.6
58.4
59.6
60.6
57.9
57.2
56.2
50.3
54.o

n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

19.2
21.8

18.4
18.1
19.4
19.6
20.6
21.8

23.8
24.6
26.1

43.5
Ji4.9
39.7
114.7
37.7

141 .a

45.9
•4.o
41.2
43.4
112.8

45.9
49.2
50.5

Sources as 1n Table 9. Chilean m.:rley supply data refer

to"~", as given 1n Deaver, 1970, pp. 60-63. catparable
are not available (n.a.)

data before

1931

-25gestures to the old financial orthodoxy; Argentina clained to have used
"profits" !'ran increases 1n the peso price of gold to create an
instituticn which supported the carmercial banks (Banco ~tral de la
Hepublica Argentina 1972, p .264).
A fairly detailed look at the budget of the Argentine central
governnent should cast sane light m major trends in expenditures and
taxes, and en the possibilities for aggregate demand management during
the 1930s.

'1be first colunn in Table 11 shows total expenditures at

current prices, which reached e. low point 1n 1932, expanding thereafter
until 1939.

Coopar1ng

naninal expenditures with the Buenos Aires cost

of living index shown in Table 6, it may be seen that 1929 real expenditures
were surpassed even during the provisimal regine or General Uriburu
(September 1930-February 1932), which had pledged an ellmination of the
excesses of the pppulist gove:mment of President Yrigoyen.

After

touching a post-1929 bottan in 1933 real expenditures expanded signi
ficantly during the secood half of the 1930s. A major road-building
program was undertaken by the govermient of General Justo (1932-1938),
himself a civil engineer, which added 30,000 kilaneters of all-weather
and inproved roads by 1938 to a system that had only 2,100 kilaneters
of such roads in 1932 (Potash 1969, p.85). '1be late 1930s also witnessed
an expansicn of military expenditures.
'1be second colturn of Table 11 coopares two major injections

in the Argentine incane stream:

govemtre1t expenditures and exports.

'!be latter gained relatively to the fonner so that by the late 1930s

they were alloost of the same magnitude.

-26TABIE 11
Indicators of Size and Structure or Argentine Central
Government Budget

Total
Expenditures
at CUrrent
Pr.ices

(1929-100)
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

93.0
100.0
ll0.5
91.9
86.0
89.1
94:5
99.3
106.4
123.6
129.4
147.8
133.7

Ratio of
Total
Expenditures
to Merchandise
Exports

0.38
o.46
0.78
0.62
0.66
0.79
0.65
o.63
o.64
0.53
0.91
0.93
0.92

Percentages of
Total Expenditures:
Changes in
Floating
Tax
Revenues Debt

80.4
75-7
60.8
75.5
87.4
91.2
96.2
99.7
93.2
90.4
86.4
80.4
93.2

n.a.
20.1
32~4
17.7
-39-1
-13.7
-1.7
-77.6
-3.2
7.8
19.8
-1.9
21.9

Public Debt
MiliWorks Service tary

15.0
19.0
17.3
8.6
5.4
9.4
14.1
16.0
17.5
19.3
20.2
15.8
15.8

n.a.
n.a.
18.3
22.4
29.2
28.3
23.l~
20.5
19.3
16.0
14.7
15.3
18.5

Sources and method: Budget data obtained fran canite Naciooal de Geografia
1941, pp. 402-405; and Ccmite Nacimal de Geografia 1943, pp.206-210.
Merchandise exports at current pesos obtained fran Diaz-Alejandro 1970, p.479.
Military eJtpenditures obta1nedfr an Potash 1969, pp. 34 and 99; they include
pensims and sane public works, which are (probably) included also in the
colunn .for "public works". Tax revenues are broadly defined to include various
fees and charges.

21.2
19.1
18.6
21.0
20.0
19.7
20.6
21.6
23.8
25.8
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

-27Tax

revenues lagged behind expenditures during President Yrigoyen's

adm:1.nistra.tioo; 1n 1930 naninal tax revenues, heavily dependent oo 1Jtl:>ort
duties, fell 1n absolute am:>unts as ma.v be seen 1n Table 12.

Large

deficits were registered 1n 1930 and 1931, which could be regarded
as induced by tte decline in foreim trade, ratter than as autoncroous
acts of policy. Both the Uriburu and the Justo administrations (and
the brilliant tecmocrats in charge of their econanic policies) took
a dim view of government deficits, and made repeated pledges to correct
the situatioo.

As 1n otter La.tin .American countries, fiscal heterodoxy

was discredited 1n Argentina by lax budgets during the late 1920s.
Both the Uriburu and the Justo adm1nistrations atterq:,ted to reduce
expenditures and to increase taxes during the early 1930s; an incane tax
was introduced in 1932 and tariff rates were increased earlier.

During the early 1930s budget deficits were primarily financed

by increases in the "noating debt", i.e., delays in payments to suppliers and civil servants or payments in public debt instrunents of low
liquidity.

Such financing methods, of course, ccntributed to giving

governnent deficits a bad name, and raised doubts about their net expansicnary
effects, as they came close to forced loans. Cnly 1n the late 1930s
an active market was to be devel~ for public debt instruments.

It

may be seen 1n Table 11 that starting in 1932 the '' noating debt"

was

reduced, but it is unclear to what extent it was settled in cash or 1n
la,ger-tenn public securities. Mooey supply data shown in Table 9
suggests the latter was the predaninant form of settlement.
Another CO'lSideration reducing the countercyclical potency
of fiscal policy during the early 1930s is the increased share in the
budget of debt service payments, mainly made to foreimers.

As may

-28TABIE 12
Argentine Central Oovemrrent Tax Revenues

Total Tax

Percentages of Total Tax Revenues:

Revenues

at Current
Prices
(1929-100)

1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

98.8
100.0
88.7
91.7
99.3
107.4
120.3 ·
130.9
131.2
147.6
147.7
157.1
164.5

CustCJM

Exchange

and Harbor

Differential
Profits

IA.lties

5lf.6
~-9
52.1
46.1
38.7
38.2
33.l
33.1
31.9
36.8
34.1
27.3
22.0

Sources and method: As 1n Table ll

0
0
0
0
0
0.1
12.6
12.l
9.0
5.8
6.5
9.6
16.2

InCOOE
Taxes

0
0
0
0

1.2
8.1
7.4

1.9
7.3
9.0
9.8
9.5
10.2

.

,':

-29be seen 1n Table 11, pa.yments a, the public debt reached 29 percent of

expenditures 1n 1932; this may be cmtrasted w1 th the meagre 5 percent
devoted to public works.

'!he 1.nport cmtent of the budget probably

peaked at the worst possible IJOTent. 4 Other Latin American cotntries

were to find the budgetary weight of debt service an additiooal induce
ment to suspend nonnal payments.
In short, there is no evidence that during the early 1930s the

Argentine government sought to increase the full enployrnent budget
deficit as a means to car;>ensate for the fall in aggregate demand.

Ch

the contrary, there is evidence-that atten;,ts were made to shift upward
the tax schedule and to lower that for government expenditures.

It may

be said, however, that even during the early 1930s the efforts to reduce

the deficit induced by the decline 1n roreiE!P trade and aggregate demand
were tenpered by either certain carm:m sense or by the sheer inability
to cut expenditures and raise taxes fast enough.

'!he relative size of

public expenditures in the inc~ stream thus grew by default already
1n the early 1930s, helping to sustain econooric activity.

public expenditures expanded in a deliberate way.

Since 1933

SUch an expansioo had

at least a balanced-boog et-nultiplier effect oo the rest of the eca,aey.

In additia,, the new Central Bank since 1935 facilitated the
creatioo of a market for the danestic public debt, allowing s~ roodest
deficit-financi ng.

Finally, the structure of expenditures during the

late 1930s favored danestic expansioo, in spite of sate increase 1n the
1nport cootent of military expenditures (Potash 1969, p.99).

Fiscal trends 1n other active Latin American countries may be
briefly cmtrasted with those for the .Argentine, using scanty or

-30ilq)ressionistic evidence.

calamities, civil disturbances or border

wars led to increased public expenditures 1n several countries, ap

parently financed directly by roonetary expansioo, in the early 1930s.
Exanples include political tunooil in Chile during late 1931 and 1932
(when that COW'ltry had a short-lived socialist government); the war
between Peru and Colart>ia over Ieticia in 1932; the second Chaco
War between Bolivia and Paraguay, also in 1932; the 8ao Paulo re
bellioo of 1932 and a severe drought in the Northeast in Brazil.
Brazil provides an interesting and documented exarrple of
a carpensatory increase in government expenditure in the early 1930s,
besides those resulting fran Northeast drought and

Sao

Paulo rebellloo.

Since 1906 Brazil had atterrpted to sustain coffee prices both abroad
and at hate Via buffer stocks.
1930s the govemnent purchased
good share

As

coffee prices fell in the early

large

quantities of that product.

A

of those purchases were financed either by foreign loans

or by new taxes, but about 35 percent appear to have been financed
essentially by m:ney creatim (Silber 1977, p.192). '!be new taxes
levied m exports, or the relative exchange rate appreciatim generated
by foreign loans, could be

said

to have inproved Brazilian tenns of

trade, relative to the relevant counterfactual situatiai (as argued by
Fishlow 1972 and Csrdoso 1979).

Argentina also started regulating the

productioo and export of major traditional exports

during

the 1930s, but

without the mass1\1e fiscal inpact of the Brazilian coffee purchases.
'lhe e x ~ ditrerential profits 11m111 1n Table 12, however, were the
Argentine comterpart to the Brazilian export taxes, both attenpting to
raise revenues as well as to protect the tenns of trade.

-31Brazil, like .Argentina, clearly expanded public expenditures
during the late 1930s, and probably reduced the inport oa,tent of those

expenditures even m:>re than Argentina, as it suspended nonnal debt
servicing in September 1931. In 1937 Brazil announced the suspensioo
of all debt servicing, and nooe occurred during 1938 and 1939 (de Paiva
Abreu 1978, pp. 109 and 119). In both Argentina and Brazil the 1930s
witnessed an inportant divers1f1cat1m of public revenues, with a remarkable
expans1m in nm-cu.stans taxes, which by 1932 (Argentina) am 1933 (Brazil)
had

exceeded the levels reached in 1929, at current prices. A s1m:1lar

trend toward tax diversificatioo has been reported for Coloot>ia and

Mexico (Wallich 1944a, pp. 122-123)~
Whatever the hesitatims and 1.nprovisatia,s of the early 1930s,

by the second half of the decade the active Latin American countries had
developed both a respectable array of monetary and fiscal tools, as
'lhus, the 1937-38

· well as the will to use them to avoid deflatia,.

recession 1n the United States was felt in the forei©'l trade statistics
Ill.lch rrore than in those for industrial output.

South American countries

damaged by the loss of European markets and shipping shortages 1n 1940
roobilized to adopt energency stabilizatia, measures, such as the Plan Pinedo
in Argentina (Diaz-Alejandro 1970, p.105).

SoCl'l

thereafter, however,

fiscal and monetary tools had to go into reverse gear to offset
innationary pressures arising rran expanding fore!m exchange reserves
and supply shortages. '!hat transltioo was not managed sm:>0thly,
perhaps with the exceptioo of pre-1944 Argentina\ but that is another
story.
'1be 1Jq)otency of passive countries ney be illustrated by

the contrasting experiences of Cuba and Mexico 1n their tinkering with
silver for mcnetary and fiscal p\.ll"pOses during the early 1930s.

-32Both countries hit upoo the expedient of issuing silver coins, which
both added to liquidity and yielded seignorage "profits" to the treasury,
justifying expenditures.

In· Cuba modest issues were made during

1932-33, and in 1934 a revolutiooary govemne1t appeared to herald a bold
new Da1etary system independent of the dollar by planning new issues

and by making silver pesos full legal tender for the discharge of old

as well as new obllgatioos contracted in dollars or in old Cuban
gold pesos.
decreed.

·

Shortly thereafter a mild fonn of exchange cootrol was

Foreign banks apparently threatened to export all dollars

fran Quba; capital night followed.

rather than expanding cootrols.

'1he govemrrent caved in, lifting

Qtly the legal tender status of silver

ror all cootracts 1n such currency remained of the 1934 refonn.
a Central Bank was to wait until 1948.

Even

(Wallich 1944b,pp. 351-352.)

Mexico, arter SaJE deflatia,ary measures 1n 1930 and 1931,
adopted early 1n 1932 a series of expansimary m:netary and fiscal
.
6
steps, relying mainly oo issues of silver pesos.
Central Bank cootrol
over camercial banks was extended and strengthened.

Fore~ banks

threatened to leave Mexico, and as the Mexican authorities held finn,
ioost of them actually did.
place.

Mexican-owned cat1Iercial banks took their

'lhese and other policies, framed under the remarkable leadership

of Alberto J. Pani, cmtributed to vigorous recovery of the Mexican
ecooaey.

Mexican reliance oo a silver standard did not generate tnnanageable

problems when the United states raised silver pr1ces;Mex1co sirrply prohibited

the export or silver IID'ley 1n April 1935 and ordered all coins to be exchanged

ror

paper currency. A year and a half later, arter the world price or silver had

t'allen, silver coinage was restored.

(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p.491).

-33As a major producer and exporter of silver, Mexico of course benefitted

f'ran higher intematicnal silver prices, which accelerated her recovery.
'!he Mexican case was in this respect different fran the disastrous

Ch1nese experience (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 699-700; cmtra.st
with the slip 1n Haberler 1976., p.10).
'!be

service of foreign capital

Before the first world war portfolio and direct investments,
DB1nly fran Europe, flowed into La.tin .America. '!hose fran the United
States were then relatively small, and concentrated 1n the caribbean,
Q!ntral .America and Mexico.

~

the 1920s United States investments

soared throughout the region, while European cnes stagnated or declined.
'lbe expansion of public.borrowing 1n the New York bood market

was par

ticularly noteworthy.
Table 13 presents estimates of the stock of British and United
States investments of all kinds in La.tin .America toward·the end of the
1920s.

In per capita tenns they remained below correspooding figures for

_Canada, but 1.nt>ressive levels were registered in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay,

Costa Rica., Mexico and especially CUba.

Both in

Csnada

and La.tin America

the two major foreign investors had accumulated a stock of claims around
four times the value of annual merchandise exports.

Assuming a five

percent rate of return., profits and interests of foreign capital nust have
accounted for about 20 percent of annual export earnings.
Pelatia,s with foreign investors had remained prickly throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Defaults had occurred en
balds issued in Ialdcn., and mmerous frictions were generated by direct

investnents. '!he Royal Navy was no stranger to South .American waters.,
ooce even attempting a naval blockade of Bolivia, and the United States

TABIE 13

Ratio of Stock of all British plus U.S. investments to
Annual Merchandise Exports and Populat1oo, circa late 1920s
Stock of Investments

to Exports
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Qrl.le
Colanbia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay

2.8
3.3
4.4
3.9
2.4
3.7
2.4

Costa Rica
Guatemala_.
Hcnduras

Nicaragua
Salvador
Panama

Cuba
Haiti
Mexico

Daninican Republic

'l'otal: Latin America

$258
56

47

195
IU

o.a

24
34
53
164
82
134
39
52
43
15
88
494
12
172
24

4.o

$107

'4.7

$635

2.1

Venezuela

Investments per capita
(CUrrent U.S. dollars)

2.9
3.3

3.5

2.8
2.2
3.1
1.8
ll.2
5.5
2.0

8.8

Canada (all foreign

Investments)

Sources and Metlx>d: For La.tin American countries the basic data canes fran
Winkler 1971 ("first published in 1928"), pp. 276,278, and 283. Export data
refer to 1927 while those for investnents are said to be for 1929 (forecasts?).
Csnadian data obtained fran Urquhart and Buckley 1965, pp. 14, 169, and 173.
Csnadian data refer to 1926 and cover direct and portfolio investments fran
all sources.

-35Marines were an inl>ortant presence in the Caribbean and Central America.
IAlr1.ng

the 1920s, however, the investment climate appeared reasonably

good, with the exception of ~xico.

'lhe continuous tensions

between Mexico and the United States over oil and other U.S. investments
led a perceptiv e observer to worry about " ••• the conflict between the
vested rights of Americans in the natural resources of the Caribbean countries
and the rising nationali sm of their peoples" {Lippmann 1927, p.353). 7
'lhese longer-te rm considera tions were overwhe ~d after 1929
by short-ten n budgetary and balance of payments difficult ies in servicing
foreieri capital.

'!he unexpected fall in dollar prices sharply increased

the real cost of external obligatio ns denominated in nom1nal tenns. Protectio n
and depressio n abroad cut into exchange earnings, actual and potential . While
nruch of the external debt of those days was long-tenn , it still called for
sare annrtiza.t ioos.

The drying up of foreim capital markets after 1930

made roll-over opera.tioos for both long-and short-ten n debt very difficult .
'!he collapse of inport duty revenues cut a traditioo al budgetary source

for paynents oo the external debt.
Table 14 shows estimates of the ratio of the long-tenn external
public debt to annual exports, both in current dollars.

A steep increase

occurred between 1929 and 1935, due to the fall 1n exports.

More ca'Jl)lete

data are available for Argentina and Brazil; these are presented in Table 15,
which also gives Csnadian data.

m foreign capital aroounted

By

1931 all net profits and interests

to 47 percent of exports

1n Brazil and 27 percent in Argentina.

1n Canada, 41 percent

All public debt services (includin g

811X>rtiza.tioos) reached 38 percent of exports in Brazil and 14 percent in
Argentina.

It was seen in Table 11 that debt service reached 21 percent

TABIE 14
Latin Anerica: Ratio of Stock of Long-Term External Public
Debt to Yearly Merchandise Exports f.o.b,

1929
1935
19lf5
1972-73
1974-76
1977-78

1.49

2.25
0.11
l.14
1.06

1.48

Sources and Method:

Data for 1929 through 1945 obtained t'ran CEPAL 1964,
pp. 24 and 27. Data since 1972 obtained fran Inter-American Developnent
Bank-1980, pp.431 and 443. 'Ihe coverage of "Latin America" differs

between these'two sources; such a difference, however, is unlikely to
JOOdify the broad trend shown above.
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TABIE 15
Argentine and Brazilian Financial Remittances as Percentages
of ~rchandise Exports, f.o.b.
All Public Debt
Services

All Net Prof1 t and
Interest Remittances

Argentina

Brazil

Argentina

Brazil

Canada

12.5

18.28

29.3

n.a•

44.5

. 1921-25
1926-28
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940-43

6.3
5.6
6.2
11.2
13.8
14.5
15.6
13.l
9.9
6.5

12.2
12.1

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
38.7
40.5
25.4
13.1
15.7
25.1
23.9
23.5

9.0
8.7

4.3

16.6
18.l
19.8
28.6
27.2
29.4
31.6
24.6
22.8
·21.3
16.0
23.4
23.8
21.3

20.3
17.1

11.2

11.9
14.9
18.2
30.0
37.9
21.'3
17.0
12.2
llt.O

3.8
10.4

32.8
46.9
53.5
42.5
32.6
28.1
24.7
21.7
28.6
27.5
11.9

1973
1974-76
1977-79

20.5
23.0
24.l

15.3
18.7
33.0

14.3
13.3
11.6

18.3
22.9
33.2

9.0
7.8
10.4

1914

8.3

22.2

8Rerers

to 1911-15
n.a.-data are not available

Sources and nethod: Pre-1944 Argentine data obtained fran CEPAL 1956, Table 18,
p.293. Pre-1944 Brazilian data obtained fran de Paiva Abreu 1980, Tables 1 and 2.
Data since 1973 for both countries obtained from World Bank 1980, Voltm1e II;
Intematimal M:>netary F\md 1980a amintematiooal Mmetary F\md 1980b.
"All Public Debt Services" include both interest and aroortizatim; to obtain
the third colunn before 1944 it was ass\mled that aroortization aroounted to
40 percent of all public debt services. "All net profit and interest
remittances" include both private and public net profit and interest
remittances.
Pre-1944 Ganadian data obtained fran Uniuhart and Buckley 1965, pp. 159 and 160.
Data since 1973 obtained as above.

-38of Argentine government expenditures in 1931.

Chile 1n 1932 faced

interest and SJTl)rtiza.tion charges, including those oo short term
maturities, far exceeding export earnings (Wallich 1943, p.321).
Starting late 1n 1931 exchange. control authorities delayed
issuing pennits to foreign canpanies for remitting abroad profits,
which had also been reduced by the crisis.

More drastically, and

also starting in 1931, mst La.t1n American countries suspended normal
pa.yments on the external debt, and asked foreign_creditors for con
versatioos airred at rescheduling and restructuring that debt.

Those

negotiations were to stretch out well into the 1940s, and into the 1950s
in sorre cases.

Different countries carTied out the conversations w1 th

various degrees of enthusiasm; Cuba, for eJCanl)le, while servicing her
debt irregularly during the 1930s maintained better relations with her
creditors than Brazil, whose dealings w1 th creditors d ~ the late
1930s, especially with British ooes, were acrinDnious.
Rescheduling and liquidations of European-held debt plus the
recovery of internatiooal trade had lowered sharply the debt/export ratio -,
by 1945, as may be seen 1n Table 14, a trend which probably cont1nued

until the early 1960s. Even in Argentina and Canada, which maintained
nonnal debt service during the 1930s, profits and interests relative

to export tended to decline in the late 1930s and early 1940s, as may
be seen in Table 15.

For La.tin America as a whole interests plus profits

as a percentage of all export earnings were down to 7 percent in the
early 1950s; only during the 1970s were these indicators to reach again
the levels of the late 1920s (Bacha· and Diaz-Alejandro

1981, Table 7) •

-39'Ihe contrast between Argentine and Brazilian policies toward

debt service in the 1930s casts sane light on the nature of inter_naticnal ecooanic relations during those years.

('Ihe punctual debt

servicing by the :r:bn:1nican Republic and Haiti presents no mystery:
the United States Marines stationed in those c01.mtries at the t ~

provide a plausible explanatory variable) • In irerchand1se account
Brazil traditiooally had an export surplus with the United States and
an inport surplus with the thl.ted Kingdan.

Argentina had an export

surplus with the lkrl.ted Kingdan, and an inport surplus with the United
States. Both the Argentine and Brazilian debts ha.cl becane d1versified
during the 1920s, but mre than half was still held by British interests.
Argentina had an export surplus with a country organizing
ccmmwealth preferences, also threatening to :inpose bilateral exchange
clearings, and where financial interests of the City still exerted great
political influence.

Australia,

Canada

and New Zealand appeared eager

to replace Argentina in British markets. British pressures culminated
in the Roca-Runciman treaty of 1933, whose features were not unlike those
of 1930s econanic treaties between Gennany and eastern European countries.
The bitterness felt both 1n Argentina and the United States at this treaty
is aptly sumnarized in a long rtietorical question of Virgil Salera:
"But could not mre far-sighted (Argentine] leadership have avoided the
granting of thoroughgoing preferences of the sort that were actually
caiceded under the tenIIS of the Roca pact, concessioos which., besides
encouraging internatiooal 111-will in the case of those countries d1s
crim1nated against, reduced Argentina to sanething close to an ecooanic
vassal of a power that had never preached nor practiced universal narrow
bilaterallsm as a new and roore satisfactory type of internatiooal econanic
policy?" (Salera 1941, p.89).

Under these circtml.Stances Argentina could

hardly aITord to tarl;)er with the nonna.l servicing of her debt.

...40-

Brazil had an export surplus with a country coornitted to
nru.ltilateral trade plus convertibility, and where the New Deal viewed
financial 1nterests withs~ suspicicn.

United States exporters to

Brazil knew that an additional dollar spent 1n Rio for debt servicing,
mainly to British 1nterests, would rrean ooe less dollar for Brazilian
inports fran the United States (Brazil had run out of reserves as
early as 1930). The British could do little when faced by eITatic
Brazilian debt service.

F\lrthenoore, during the second half of the

1930s there was preoccupation in Washington with (;ennan 1nfluence 1n
Brazil, leading to even.roore tolerant views of Brazilian debt service
ir.t'egularities (de Paiva Abreu 1978) • S1m1.lar geopolltical considerations
may also explain the relatively mild respa,se of the Roosevelt adrn1nis

tratiai to the Mexican oil natiaializa.tioos of 1938.
Intematiaial capital markets never quite recovered from the
1930s defaults.

Such an experience, particularly that 1nvolv1ng noo-

1ndustrial countries, is still used to buttress argt.m1ents favoring the
organization of sanctiais against possible LDC defaults during the 1980s
(Eaton and Gersovitz 1980, pp. 7...9 and 53). Without heavy penalties on
defaults, it is argued, intematiooal capital markets will IOObilize too
few .funds, as bankers ration credit to offset the adverse selectiai
inperfectiai.

As

there are no more recent exanples of widespread defaults

than those of the 1930s, it is iJtl>ortant to inquire whether the defaults
resulted mainly fran virtual inpossibillty to pay and fran unexpected changes
in intematiaial rules, or whether debtor countries coolly broke their
caitracts basically because they calculated that they could get away with
it, due to lack of sanctiais.

-41Wr1t1ng in 'lbe American Ecooanic Review for 1943 Henry C. Wallich
argued that, at least for Latin American dollar bends, the causes of
default were well-known and deserved little elaboratiCJ1:

"If the

depressioo of the 1930's had been mild, and if the steady expansion of
world trade and capital exports had CCl'ltinued thereafter, defaults
probably would have been infrequent and could have been settled without
IDlch difficulty ••• Without ••• atte1Tt>ting to deny that insufficient care

was exercised, and that Latin .American countries were encouraged to
borrow excessively ooe may questiCJ1 whether these factors were decisive
(Wallich 1943, p.321).
Other camentary of the 1930s and 1940s enphasized that
inperfections 1n the 1920s capital markets arose not just fran the
inability of halest and ~tent bankers and underwriters to tell which
borrowers really planned to service their debts, independently of,
financial positioo. Many underwriters were accused not just of negligence
in seeking infonna.tioo about borrowers and their projects, but also
of deliberately misleading the proberbial widows and orphans (Winkler 1932.
and even CUni>erland 1932) •

Mich New Deal legislation sought to check

~dishonesty 1n .financial intenrediatioo.
'Ihe crisis of the 1930s went beyood ma.croecoocrnic collapse and

the protectiau.st upsurge.

'!he industrialized countries themselves led

in the underndning of belief in the sanctity of cootracts; exmll)les
include the British default oo the war debt, Gennany's failure to make
payments m the greater part of her intematia,al. obligations, and the
derogatioo of the gold clause in the United States (Wallich 1943, p.322).
Iur1ng the 1940s the United Kingdan froze growing stel'l1ng

balances of many developing countries, balances whose real value was
sharply eroded by inflation, and actually cootenplated canplete repudiation.

-42A substantial body of British econanic opinion even today regrets that

repooiatioo was not adopted (Bolten 1972).
By the late 1930s the ability to service the debt had 1.nt>roved

1n many La.tin American countries and indeed scm? servicing did occur

throughout the 1930s.

'!here were gains to be made 1n avoiding repudiation,

even in the absence of Eaton-Gersovitz sanctions.

Sane countries purchased

their own partially or wholly unserviced bonds, which were selling at a
discount, 1n foreign markets.

'!his was regarded by sane as perfidious:

you default, ruin the prices of your bonds, and then quietly buy them back.
As

late_as 1943 Henry Wallich argued that such repurchases were not

only defensible but, under the circumstances, coostituted the best
method of dealing with the defaulted bonds " •••not merely fran the view
point of the debtor but to sane extent even fran that of the bondholder"
(Walllch 1943, p. 332) •
'Ihe repurchase, Wallich argued, avoided a rigid settlenent at

a t ~ when the intematimal econanic outlook was very uncertain.
Repurchases had a tecmical advantage which today seems archaic:

they

could be carT1.ed out by Central Banks, whose exchange reserves were
rising in the early 1940s, while normal servicing was the respa,sibility
of Treasuries, whose revenue situatim had been hurt by the fall 1n ~rts
and the correspooding decline in duties.

Wallich noted that by the

late 1930s and early 1940s the defaulted Latin American bonds had
becooe unsuitable to the portfolios of their original holders, so it
could be asst.med that a large part was held by speculators.

'!his

coosidera.ticn, plus the ma.croeccnanic advantages derived by the United
States fran capital exports during the 1920s, plus the irregularities
found m both sides in many loan transactions, made the ethics of
resuming debt service highly problematical.

'!be early use of Keynesian

_l.j3_

analysis led Wallich to write., sanewhat tongue-in-cheek, that: "'Tis
better to have lent and lost than never to have lent at all" (Wallich
1943, p.328).

He rec~nded a generous policy toward the debtors,

without a hint of new codes for sanctioning defaults.

Indeed, he

suggested that the service of loans which the EXIMBANK began to extend

to I.atin American countries since 1940 should be made contingent upon

the exports of each country.
Regardless of the ethics and legalities of defaults, the
economics of the 1930s induce tolerance.

What Gottfried Haberler has

written justifying the suspension of German reparations applies a fortiori
to I.atin American defaults:

" ••• when productive resources were allowed

to go to waste 1n idleness and countries everywhere were restricting
inports to protect jobs, it made no econanic sense whatsoever to insist
oo the transfer of real resources as reparatioos'' (~rler 1976, p.28).
Reparatioos, like debt service, were fundamentally victims of the
Great Depression: " ••• there can be hardly a doubt that the transfer of
the reparations as fixed by the Young plan would have been possiblein the absence, to repeat, of a serious depression and depression-induced
protectionism" (Haberler 1976, p.31).
Concluding reflections
For roost I.atin .Arrerican ccxmtries the 1930s and early 1940s
were "the worst of tines and the best of tines".

Arter the initial

external blows the active countries steadily gained in both ability and
will to maintain growth regardless of foreign ccnditioos. 'lhe public
sector undertook new developnent tasks, while the naticnal private
sector seems to have experienced an upsurge.

Countries learned to rely

oo danestic finance for capital fonna.ticn and to do without

many

inports.

Inport-substitution extended to economic policy: gene were Kerrnerer,

-44NieJJEyer and Fisher8 ,

their place partly taken by Prebisch and Pc:ni,

and partly by new "inports" such as Tr1ffin and Wallich.

Dorrestic

ecooanic policy witnessed a roost creative period, encouraged by the
new foreign ~visors.

Thus Tr1ffin defended La.tin American exc~

cootrols (Triffin 1944b, pp. 112-113) and advised Paraguay to peg to

a basket of currencies (Triffin 1944c, pp. 6-7).

La.tin American

experiences sparked further insights in the late 1940s: Polak outlined
the "absorptioo approach" in a paper written in connectioo with
Mexico's 1948 devaluation (Polak 1948).

Polak has also noted, in

private cooversatio o, that the early developrrent of the JOOnetary approach
to the balance of paynents was heavily innuenced by Rodrigo Ganez,

of the Central Bank of Mexico.
Policies which made sense during 1929-1945 turned out not
to be so desirable after the second world war.

Sare

cotmtries adapted

to the rore prosperous and peaceful intematioo al econanic conditioos
fairly quickly, while others remained obsessed by export-pessimism and
fears of tmenploYJJEnt and of a new world war.

'lhus, while Mexico sought

new sources of foreign exchange and achieved price stability by the
1950s, Argentina and Brazil remained tangled in ext~ protectionis m
and inflation.

To

what extent the Argentine and Brazilian policy errors

of the 1950s were inevitable coosequences of the 1930s is highly questionabl e,
and beyood the scope of this paper.
To

cooclude, two lessons of the 1930s seem particularl y relevant

for the 1980s.

In a world of e?Tatic changes in tenns of trade, tmpre

dictable protectionis m and high capital roobility, ccmn.1tment to fixed
exchange rates, unllm1.ted convertibil ity and gold-standa rd-type DD'letary
rules seems rash and risky. 'Ihe seca1d lesson applies to cred1 tor countries.

If by their actions they seriously disturb the nonnal expectations
existing at the tine loans were made, they may destroy the reverse
transfer nechanism.

Such lesson would apply either to old or new

capital exporters, and unusual actions would include protectionism,
the tolerance of P+'Ola1ged depression, or extravagant increases 1n
oil prices or interest rates.

car10s F. Diaz Alejandro

-46Footnotes
lpor a closer look at the evolution of tenns of trade and export quantum
see Diaz-Alejandro 1980a, pp. 351-382.

For Chile both the tenns of trade

and the export quantum collapsed , leading to the steepest decline 1n
the purchasin g power of exports registere d 1n La.tin America.
2

A look at disaggreg ated cost of 11v:1ng indices can also be revealing .

In Uruguay, for example, the clothing price index rose relative to that

for foodstuff s •.

3See the fascinatin g lectures given by

Raul

Prebisch in Mexico during 1944,

available in Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 1972, especiall y
pp. 290-291.

'lhe link between exchange rate policies and industria l

expansioo is explicitl y made in these lectures; see p.295.
4with1n
the military budget outlays for inported equiixoont seem to have
been reduced while those for salaries and pensions were increased (Potash
1969,p:74-75). But the quantitat ive inpact of such a shift appears small
relative to debt service data.
5In an article published in 1944,
Robert Triffin asserted:

"In the short

period since 1935 the Central Bank of Argentina has developed into an
outstandi ng institutio o

moong

in older countries as well.

central banks not roly.in La.tin America but

Credit for this achievement is due largely

to the brilliant leadershi p of Raoul [sic] Prebisch, general manager of

the bank during roost of this period, and to an extrenely able staff of
executive s and research workers" (Triffin 1944b, pp. 100-101).
¾r Mexico I shamelessly follow the tmpublished work of two young
Mexican scholars, who happen to be graduate students at Yale: Enrique cardenas
and Jaime Zabludowsky. My

sumnary

of their researche s does not do full

justice to their papers.

I am grateful for their pennissioo to use

those papers.
7Wh11e adopting a paternalistic tooe, highly offensive
today ("01e
persistent mtive in these uprisings is the desire to assert the natiooal
independence and the dignity of an inferior race"), Lippman coocluded
with words which could be read with profit 54 years later in the
United States State Deparbtent:

"And nothing would be so certain to

arouse still further this illwill as the realization in Latin America
that the Un1ted States had adopted a policy, conceived in the spirit of
Metternich, which would attempt to guarantee vested rights against social
progress as the Latin peoples conceive it" (Lippmann 1927, pp.357 and 363).
8Kermerer's
prestige in the United States and in La.tin America seems to
have peaked 1n the late 1920s. For a sumnary of his views see his
Presidential address to the American Econanic Association (K~rer 1927).
Irving Fisher

advised the Calles governnent in Mexico during the early

1930s, but the nature of his advice is unknown (Suarez 1977, pp. 51-52).

Carlos F. Diaz AleJandrci.
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